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Max Miiller, on October 28th of
one of the most notable personages of the academic world passed from the stage of history. We say "stage"
advisedly, for Max Miiller's career was in more senses than one
histrionic, in the best sense of that word, and there was hardly a
moment of his life that he did not stand prominently and conspicuously before the public notice.
To the unlearned world at large,
he was the personification of philological scholarship, a scholarship which he knew how to render accessible to his public in inimitably simple and charming style.
There was no domain of philosophy, mythology, or religion, that he left untouched or unmodified
by his comprehensive researches, and the Science of Language,
which is the greatest scholastic glory of the German nation, would
appear, judging from his books alone, to have received in him its
final incarnation and Messianic fulfilment.
There was no national
or international dispute of modern times, ever so remotely connected with philological questions, but his ready pen was seen
swinging in the thick of the combat, and his Sanskrit roots made
to bear the burden of a people's destiny.
He was the recipient of
more academic honors, orders, titles, royal and imperial favors,
perhaps, than any other scholar since Humboldt, and he bore the
greatness that was thrust upon him with the grace and dignit}' of
a born aristocrat.
Many were the pummellings he received from
the hands of his less favored but more plodding colleagues yet
their buffets of ink but served to throw his Titanic figure into
greater relief, and to afford him an opportunity by his delicate,
insidious irony to endear himself still more to his beloved public.
Apart from his great and sound contributions to the cause of learnthe death of Friedrich

this year,

—

;

1-RIEURICH

MAX MUELLER.

ing and thought, which none will deny,

Max
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Miiller's indisputably

—

was to have made knowledge agreeable, nay,
even fashionable, and his proudest boast was that when delivering his lectures on the Science of Language at the Royal Institution, Albemarle street was thronged with the crested carriages of
the great, and that not only "the keen dark eyes of Faraday,"
"the massive face of the Bishop of St. David's," but even the
countenances of royalty, shone out upon him from his audiences.
Friedrich Maximilian Miiller was born in Dessau, Germany,
He was the son of the well-known German
on December 6, 1823.
poet Wilhelm Miiller, the great-grandson of Basedow, the reformer
of national education in all Germany, and the grandson of a
Prime Minister to the Duke of Anhalt-Dessau. His environment
was thus, from the start, one of the highest culture, and he received through its advantages a thorough education, especially in
At Leipsic, where he atmusic, in which he was very proficient.
tended the famous Nicolai School, and afterwards the University,
greatest service

—

he lived

in

the musical house of Professor Carus, father of Prof.

V. Carus, the translator of Darwin, where he gained the friendship

Mendelssohn, Liszt, David, Kalliwoda, Hiller, and Clara Schumann. Here, and afterwards at Berlin, Paris, and London, he made
of

the acquaintance of the great notabilities of the day,

among whom

were numbered Riickert, Humboldt, Burnouf, Froude, Ruskin,
Carlyle, Faraday, Grote, Darwin, Emerson, Lowell, and Holmes.
It was the Orientalist Burnouf that encouraged him to puba labor which brought him
lish the first edition of the Rig-Veda,
to England in 1846 and which he completed twenty five years
afterwards, having laid in the meantime the foundation of his
career and become a fellow of Oxford, an incumbent of two professorships, and curator of the Oriental Works of the Bodleian
Library.
His edition of the Rig Veda, his History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, and his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy are the
works on which his technical reputation stands. Of that enormous
and meritorious undertaking, the translation of the Sacred Books of
the East (49 vols.), he was the editor, but personally translated only
the Upanishads, the Vedic Hyrnns, the Dhammapada and some of the
Mahayana texts. His numerous other writings, on the Science 0/
Language (2 volumes, 1861-1864), the Science of Thought (2 volumes, 1887), the Science of Religion (6 volumes, Hibbert and Gifford
Lectures, 1870-1892), important as they are, were rather popular
and expository in their nature and devoted to the presentation of
his own personal philosophy, which to the very end of his life he

—
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propagated and defended with uncommon ardor and success. In
all these works we read Max Muller the philosopher and theorist,
In fact, he expressly disclaimed
not Max Muller the philologist.
being a philologist in the pure technical sense, and boldly hailed
the Science of Lanhimself as the protagonist of a new science,
guage, which was to him but a means to an end, "a telescope to
watch the heavenly movements of our thoughts, a microscope to
discover the primary cells of our concepts." And whatever impress he left upon the thought of his time, will have come from
In addition to this, he was the apostle and guide
these works.
of the great public in the domain of linguistic science, and he ranks
with Huxley and Tyndall as a shaper of popular scientific thought.

—

Two of his little books. Three Introductory Lectures on the Science
of Thought and Three Lectures on the Science of Language, together
with the essay Persona, were published in the first numbers of The
Open Coitrt and afterwards appeared in book form. These books
sum up in elegant and terse manner his philosophy, and we shall
devote a few words to them after we have dwelt more at length on
his interesting personality.

PERSONAL REMINISCENCES.

Max

Miiller's career as a scholar

and philosopher was

indis-

solubly connected with his career as a man, and his thought and
his controversies in the latter half of his life were all colored by

dominant ambitions. In his delightful reminiscences, entitled
Auld Lang Syne-, published two years before his death (New York,
Scribner's), Professor Muller has himself told many stories which
are illustrative of the high estimation in which he was held by the
his

One circles about the import of a witty letter of Darwin's,
he had combated on the ground that language formed an
Romanes regarded
inseparable barrier between brute and man.
the letter as an instance of Darwin's "extraordinary humility."
world.

whom

Professor Muller saw in

it

more

estly deprecates the notion that

guilty of considering

it

humor than humility, and modhe should ever have been thought

of

as a trophy.

We think that neither Romanes

nor Muller has read the letter aright.

The

following

Down, I^eckenham, Kent,

My Dear
I

am

Sir

is

the text:

15th Oct., 1875.

;

greatly obliged to you for so kindly sending

sure will interest

me much.

With

me your

essay,

respect to our differences, though

remarks have been rather stinging, they have

all

which

some

been made so gracefully,

I

of

I

am

your

declare

FRIEDRICH MAX NrUELLER.
that

I

am

like the

man

who boasted

in the story

whipped by a Duke.
Pray believe me, yours very

that he
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had been soundly horse-

sincerely,

Charles Darwin.
In his Recollections of Royalty, he tells of an amusing incident
that nearly prevented his compliance with an invitation to dine

with the King of Prussia at Potsdam, together with Humboldt.
" But a curious intermezzo happened.

with

my

While

I

was quietly

sitting in

my room

mother, a young lieutenant of police entered, and began to ask a number

of extremely silly questions
to

England, what had kept

to

him

that

I

— why
me

I

had come

was collecting Sanskrit MSS.

peremptory, and informed

me

at

when

I meant to return
had fully explained
the Royal Library, he became more

to Berlin,

so long in Berlin, etc.

After

I

that the police authorities thought that a fortnight

had been so!), and
I produced my
passport, perfectly en regie I explained that I wanted but another week to finish
my work. It was all of no avail, I was told that I must leave in twenty-four hours.
I then collected my thoughts, and said very quietly to the young lieutenant, 'Please
to tell the police authorities that I shall, of course, obey orders, and leave Berlin
at once, but that I must request them to inform His Majesty the King that I shall
not be able to dine with him to-night at Potsdam.' The poor young man thought
I was laughing at him, but when he saw that I was in earnest he looked thunderstruck, bowed, and went away. ... It was not long, however, before another police
official appeared, an elderly gentleman of pleasant manners, who explained to me
how sorry he was that the young lieutenant of police should have made so foolish
He begged me entirely to forget what had happened, as it would seria mistake.
ously injure the young lieutenant's prospects if I lodged a complaint against him.
I promised to forget, and, at all events, not to refer to what had happened in the

must be amply

sufficient for that

me

that they requested

to leave

purpose (how

I

wished that

it

Berlin within twenty-four hours.

;

Royal presence."

The young
with Humboldt

professor returned from Sans Souci in the carriage
:

"I could not resist telling him [Humboldt] in strict confidence my little adI hope he did not
venture with the police lieutenant, and he was highly amused.
tell the King; anyhow, no names were mentioned."

He was on intimate terms also with the Crown
He writes of their meeting at Ems, in 1871

erick.

" At

Prince Fred-

:

Ems

the Prince

was the popular hero

of the day,

and wherever he showed

He sent me word that he
himself he was enthusiastically greeted by the people.
wished to see me. When I arrived, the antechambers were crowded with Highand ribands. I gave my card
I must wait, but I soon
saw there was not the slightest chance of my having an audience that morning. I
had no uniform, no order, no title. From time to time an officer called the name
Sudof Prince So-and-So, Count So-and-So, and people became very impatient.
denly the Prince himself opened the door, and called out in a loud voice, 'MaxiThere was consternation in the crowd
milian, Maximilian, kommen Sie herein
as I walked through, but I had a most pleasant half-hour with the Prince."
nesses, Excellencies, Generals, all covered with stars
to

an A. D. C. as simple

Max

Miiller,

and was

!

'

told that
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In 1888,

Ems, but
"

Max

their

Miiller and the Crown Prince were again
meeting on this occasion was frustrated

at

:

The Crown Prince had

sent

that he wished to see me once more but
had been favoured quite enough, and our
No doubt princes must be protected against

me word

his surroundings evidently thought that

meeting again was cleverly prevented.

;

I

intruders, but should they be thwarted in their

own wishes

?"

mention his having won sixpence from the Prince of
whist, Professor Miiller was the recipient of many other
distinguished favors from the English Royal family, notably from
Prince Leopold, who during his stay at Oxford always reserved
for the great philologist some of his ancient and rare Johannisberger, from the famous crue of Prince Metternich.
" Once more the Prince was most kind to me under most trying circumstances.
I teleI was to dine at Windsor, and when I arrived my portmanteau was lost.

Not
Wales at

to

po tmanteau was found at Oxford station,
efore 8 30. Prince Leopold, who was
staying at Windsor, and to whom I went in my distress, took the matter in a most
I thought I might send an excuse to say that I had had an accident
serious spirit.
and could not appear at table; but he said 'No, that is impossible. If the Queen
He then sent round all the castle to fit me
asks you to dinner, you must be there.'

graphed and telegraphed, and

at last the

but there was no train to arrive at Windsor

I

:

—

Everybody seemed to have contributed some article of clothing, coat, waistI looked a perfect guy, and I declared that I
tie, shorts, shoes and buckles.
I was actually penning
could not possibly appear before the Queen m that attire.
a note when the 8 30 train arrived, and with it my luggage, which I tore open,
dressed in a few minutes, and appeared at dinner as if nothing had happened.
"Fortunately the Queen, who had been paying a visit, came in very late.
Whether she had heard of my misfortunes, I do not know. But I was very much
impressed when I saw how, with all the devotion that the Prince felt for his mother,
there was this feeling of respect, nay, almost of awe, that made it seem impossible
to tell his mother that I was prevented by an accident from obeying her command
and appearing at dinner."
out.

coat,

PHILOSOPHICAL.

To Max
problem

Miiller the

problem

of the origin of thought,

of the origin of

and

in

language was the

the researches of the Sci-

ence of Language were contained for him in nuce the solutions of
the Science of Thought. Language, for him, was petrified reason,
the geological record of human thought, as well as its living veHe admires above all its simplicity: ^
hicle.
"If we have,

number

say, eight

hundred material or predicative roots and a small

of demonstrative elements given us, then, roughly speaking, the riddle of

language

is

solved.

We

know what language is, what it
much its complexity as its

thus enabled to admire, not so

But whence these roots?

Here

is

made

of,

and we are

translucent simplicity.'

the delicate question.

The following quotations are from Max Miiller's Three
of Thought, piiblifhed by the Open Court Pub. Co.
1

is

Introiluetory Lectures on the Science

FRIEDRICH MAX MUELLER,
"There are three things
them

that

have

to
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be explained

in roots,

such as we find

:

2.

Their being intelligible^, not only to the speaker but to all
Their having a definite body of consonants and vowels

3.

Their expressing general concepts."

1.

who

listen to

him

;

In the explanation of these three characteristics, the solution

problem

of the

man

lies.

The sounds

as a part of nature,

physical

of nature,

phenomena merely. And

interjections of rational

even those emitted by

are in themselves

human

this

unmeaning

;

they are

also true of the emotional

is

beings:

they are mere puffs of

wind, individual in their significance, and standing on the same
level with the botv-ivo7i' of the dog.
" It

was Professor Noire who first pointed out that roots, in order to be intellimust have been from the very first social sounds. sounds uttered
by several people together. They must have been what he calls the clamor concomitans, uttered almost involuntarily by a whole gang engaged in a common
work.
Such sounds are uttered even at present by sailors rowing together, by
peasants digging together, by women spinning or sewing together.
They are
uttered and they are understood. And not only would this clamor concomiians be
understood by all the members of a community, but on account of its frequent
repetition it would soon assume a more definite form than belongs to the shouts of
individuals, which constantly vary, according to circumstances and individual ten-

—

gible to others,

dencies."

But the most difficult problem still remains. How did those
sounds become signs, not simply of emotions, but of concepts?
For all roots are expressive of concepts our intellectual life is all
conceptual.
How was the first concept formed?
;

"

Thought has to solve. At present
number of sensuous intuitions, and after descrying something
which they share in common, we assign a name to it, and thus get a concept. For
instance, seeing the same color in coal, ink, and in a negro, we form the concept
or seeing white in milk, snow, and chalk, we form the concept of white.
of black
In some cases a concept is a mere shadow of a number of percepts, as when we
speak of oaks, beeches, and firs, as trees.
But suppose we had no such names as
That

we simply

is

the question which the Science of

take a

;

black,

and white, and

"We
when

tree,

where would our concept be

?

human mind
names nor concepts, and the question which we
which we have discovered as the elements of lan-

are speaking, however, of a period in the growth of the

there existed as yet neither

have to answer is, how the roots
guage came to have a conceptual meaning. Now the fact is, the majority of roots
express acts, and mostly acts which men in a primitive state of society are called
upon to perform I mean acts such as digging, plaiting, weaving, striking, throwing, binding, etc.
All of these are acts of which those who perform them are ipso
facto conscious and as most of these acts were continuous or constantly repeated,
we see in the consciousness of these repeated acts the first glimmer of conceptual
thought, the first attempt to comprehend many things as one. Without any effort
;

;

of their

own

the earliest framers of language found the consciousness of their

own

repeated acts raised into conceptual consciousness, while the sounds by which
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these acts were accompanied

became spontaneously what we now

call

conceptual

roots in every language."

These

results quite agree with the psychological conclusions

Mach (see The Open Court for June of this year, p.
"The Concept"), who regards concepts as bundles of direc-

of Professor

348,

and conceptual names and
sounds as the keys that unlock the impulses to these activities the
whole resting on the conscious repetition of actions.
Professor Noir^ emphasises another feature of the process.
He thinks that "true conceptual consciousness begins only from
the time when men became conscious of results, of facts, and not
tions for performing definite activities,

:

The mere consciousness of the acts of digging, strikdoes not satisfy him. Only when men perceive the
for instance, in the hole dug, in the tree
results of their acts
struck down, in the reeds tied together as a mat did they, according to him, arrive at conceptual thought in language."
Such, then, is the origin of the one hundred and twenty cononly of acts.

ing, binding,

—

—

cepts to which the eight hundred roots of the Indo-European lan"These one hundred and twenty concepts
guages are reducible.
are the rivers that feed the whole ocean of thought and speech.
is no thought that passes through our mind, or that has
passed through the minds of the greatest poets and prophets of
old, that cannot directly or indirectly be derived from one of these
fundamental concepts."
And these thoughts, "the whole of our intellect, all the tricks
of the wizard in our brain, consist in nothing but addition and subBut what
traction," in nothing but combination and separation.

There

is it

that

We

is

combined and separated?

shall forego the metaphysical discussion of the possibility

of sensation

and experience which

Max

Miiller interpolates at this

stage of the development of his theory, and shall
to the point at issue,

— his enunciation of
He

the identity of language and thought.

"How

says

:

how
know and never shall know. But having the
darkness within us, what do we know of any cause of darkproduce

aethereal vibrations

neurosis becomes ssthesis,
sensations of light or

jump immediately

his celebrated doctrine of

we do

in us

consciousness of something,

not

?
Nothing. We simply suffer darkness, or enjoy light,
but what makes us suffer and what makes us rejoice, we do not know, till zee can

ness or any cause of light

express

it.

"And how
language only.
to distinguish

do we express

We may

We may

it ?

feel dark,

darkness as what

are not in a state of knowledge,

is

we

but

till

try

what we

we have

a

like,

name

we can express

for

not light, or light as what

is

it

in

dark and are able
not darkness,

are only in a state of passive stupor.

we

FRIEDRICH MAX MUELLER.
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we can possess and retain, even without language,
phantasmata that, for instance, when lightning has passed before our eyes, the impression remains for some time actually visible, then vanishes
more and more, when we shut our eyes, but can be called back by the memory,
whenever we please. Yes, we can call it back, but not till we can call, that is, till
we can name it. In all our mental acts, even in that of mere memory, we must be
able to give an account to ourselves of what we do, and how can we do that except
Even in a dream we do not know what we see, except we name it,
in language?
Everything else passes by and vanishes
that is, make it knowable to ourselves.
unheeded. We either are simply suffering, and in that case we require no language,
or we act and react, and in that case we can react on what is given us, by language
only.
This is really a matter of fact and not of argument. Let any one try the
experiment, and he will see that we can as little think without words as we can
often imagine that

certain pictures or

;

breathe without lungs."

By
is,

words, however,

Max

Miiller

means

"All

signs.

I

maintain

that thought cannot exist without signs, and that our most im-

portant signs are words."
" How is it, I have been asked, that people go through the most complicated
combinations while playing chess and all this without uttering a single word ? Does
not that show that thought is possible without words, and, as it were, by mere intuition ?
It may seem so, if we imagine that speech must always be audible, but
we have only to watch ourselves while writing a letter, that is, while speaking to a
friend, in order to see that a loud voice

is

not essential to speech.

Besides, by long

usage speech has become so abbreviated that, as with mathemathetical formulas,

one sign or

letter

may comprehend

long trains of reasoning.

we could play chess without language, however

And how can we

im-

however abbreviWhat are king, queen, bishops, knights, castles, and
ated, however algebraic ?
pawns, if not names ? What are the squares on the chessboard to us, unless they
had been conceived and named as being square and neither round nor oblong ?
" I do not say, however, that king and queen and bishops are mere f/a»ies.
" There is no such a thing as a mere name.
A name is nothing if it is not a
nomen, that is, what is known, or that by which we know. Nometi was originally
gnome^i, from giiosco to know, and was almost the same word as notio, a notion.
A mere name is therefore self-contradictory. It means a name which is not a
name; but something quite different, namely, a sound, a /lain s I'ocis. We do not
then why should
call an empty egg-shell a mere egg, nor a corpse a mere man
we call a name without its true meaning, a mere name ?
"But if there is no such thing as a mere name, neither is there such a thing
as a mere thought or a mere concept. The two are one and inseparable. We may
but to
distinguish them as we distinguish the obverse from the reverse of a coin
try to separate them would be like trying to separate the convex from the concave
We think in names and in names only."
surface of a lens.
agine that

silent,

;

;

We
The

are

now

in a position to

entire fabric of the

mind

is

grasp his view in

its full

import.

identical with the fabric of

human

speech, and the whole history of philosophy reveals

itself

but as

the natural growth of language.

"Reason ... is language, not simply as we now hear it and use it, but as
has been slowly elaborated by man through all the ages of his existence on earth-
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Reason

is

the growth of centuries,

it is

the

work of man, and

at the

same time an

instrument brought to higher and higher perfection by the leading thinkers and

No reaso7i zuithoiit lajignage, no language zvitJioul
Try to reckon without numbers, whether spoken, written, or otherwise
marked, and if you succeed in that, I shall admit that it is possible to reason or
reckon without words, and that there is in us such a thing, or such a power or facspeakers of the world.
reason.

apart from words."

ulty, as reason,

Max

famous doctrine of the Idenin which he is supported
by a long line of illustrious predecessors.^ It is not our purpose
This
in this place to offer any criticism of its general tenability.
has been done, in part, by the editor of this magazine in two essays
in The Motiist, to which readers desirous of more details are referred. ^
It merely remains for us to remark that Max Miiller's
theory, which it is sometimes difficult to grasp precisely in its
critical points, is now held, even by those who admit the intrinsic
truth of his assertions, only with great modification. His definition
of thought is upon the whole arbitrary and made pro domo.
The
barrier between man and animal is not so impassable as he liked
to imagine, and the tendency of recent thought in comparative
psychology has swerved from his position. But the beauty of style,
the wealth and breadth of learning, the controversial skill with which
he advocated his doctrine are undeniable, and the controversies to
which his zealous championing of his cause led have advanced the
cause of truth immeasurably. And this, he avers in an impersonal
moment, is his whole concern
Such, in epitome,

tity of

is

Miiller's

Language and Thought, — a docrine

:

"

You say

words.

I

shall never live to see

This does not discourage me.

for truth, not for success.
truth, love truth

;

And

truth

it

admitted that

Through
is

man

cannot reason without

the whole of

my

We may

not our own.

life I

have cared

seek truth, serve

but truth takes care of herself, and she inspires her true lovers

Those who cannot believe in themselves,
known what truth is. Those who
have found truth, know best how little it is their work, and how small the merit
which they can claim for themselves. They were blind before, and now they can
see
That is all."
with the same feeling of perfect trust.

unless they are believed in by others, have never

And

again

:^

"Scholars come and go and are forgotten, but the road which they have
opened remains, other scholars follow in their footsteps, and though some of them
This conviction is our best reretrace their steps, on the whole there is progress.
svard, and gives us that real joy in our work which merely personal motives can
never supply."
1

cago

See the
:

2 "

article "

My

Predecessors "

The Open Court Publishing Co.
The Continuity of Evohition," The

in his

Three Lectures on the Science of Language.

Monist, Vol,

of the Self," The Monist. Vol. VIII., p. 123.
''Contributions to the Science of Mythology, Vol.

I.,

II., p.

p. viii.

70

;

" Prof. F.

Max

Miiller's

Chi-

Theory

IKIEIJKICH

The cause
labors of Prof.

MAX MUELLER.

under great obligation to the
spirit of his motives in pubSacred Books of i he East can have

of true religion also

Max

is

The very

Miiller.

lishing translations of ihe gxedit

been productive only
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of good.

by such a publication of the Sacred Books of all
were in possession of books of canonical authority, some very old
prejudices might be removed, and the truth of St. Augustine's words might be confirmed, that there is no religion without some truth in it, nay, that the ancients,
We may well hope that a
too, were in possession of some Christian truths.
study of the Sacred Books of the East may produce a kindlier feeling on the part
of many people, and more particularly of missionaries, towards those who are
called heathen, or even children of Satan, though they have long, though ignorand that a study of
antly, worshipped the God who is to be declared unto them
other religions, if based on really trustworthy documents, shall enable many people
to understand and appreciate their own religion more truly and more fairly.
Just
as a comparative study of languages has thrown an entirely new light on the nature
and historical growth of our own language, a comparative study of religions also, I
hoped, would enable us to gain a truer insight into the peculiar character of Christianity, by seeing both what it shares in common with other religions, and what
distinguishes it from all its peers."

"I had a

secret hope that

religions that

.

.

.

;

And he

lived to see his

hopes realised by the marvellous trans-

formations of the religious attitude wrought by the Parliament of
Religions of our World's Fair.

As

to his personal belief,

cise details in his works, ^

Miiller

was

which

He was

a Vedantist.

is

we may say

not easy to grasp in

its

pre-

generally that Professor

Max

Brahman

doc-

a believer in the

trine of the atman, or soul-in-itself, the
in a

monad

soul; he believed

"thinker of thoughts," a "doer of deeds," a Self within the

person, which was the carrier of his personality, and a Self with-

which was the carrier of the world, "God, the highest Self";
and these two Selves are ultimately the same Self Tat tvatn asi,
That art thou, as the Brahman said.
These views of his have received full discussion in the article
of Dr. Carus before referred to.^
How deeply they entered his being and with what little modification they might have been transformed into the opposing theory of modern psychology, is apparent from the following beautiful passage quoted from Persona (see
Vol. I. of The Open Court, pp. 505 and 543
out,

:

)

"We
we

are told that what distinguishes us from

are personal beings.

our

life

We

all

other living beings

is

that

are persons, responsible persons, and our very being,

and immortality, are represented as depending on our personality.

But

if

remark of the Pferdebiirla, in the delightful essay of that name
in the D-utsche Rundschau for 1897: " Max, du bist vielleicht auch noch ein Gottesfabler.
Max. ein ganz Freier bist du immer noch nicht."
1

Compare,

for example, the

.

2

The Monist, Vol. VIIL.

p. 123.

.

.
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means, and why we are called persoiice, the answers
Does our personality consist in our being English or German,
in our being young or old, male or female, wise or foolish ?
And if not, what remains when all these distinctions vanish ? Is there a higher Ego of which our human ego is but the shadow ? From most philosophers we get but uncertain and
evasive answers to these questions, and perhaps even here, in the darkest passages
of psychological and metaphysical inquiry, a true knowledge of language may

we ask what

this personality

are very ambiguous.

prove our best guide.
'

'

Let us remember that fci-soiia had two meanings, that it meant originally a
it soon came to be used as the name of the wearer of the mask.

mask, but that

Knowing how many ambiguities of thought arose from this, we have a right to ask:
Does our personality consist in the persona we are wearing, in our body, our
senses, our language and our reason, our thoughts, or does our true personality lie
somewhere else? It may be that at times we so forget ourselves, our true Self, as
to imagine that we are Romeo and Juliet, King Lear, or Prince Hamlet.
Nor can
we doubt that we are responsible each for his own dratnatis persona, that we are
hissed or applauded, punished or rewarded, according as

we

act the part allotted

drama, badly or well. But the time comes when we awake,
when we feel that not only our flesh and our blood, but all that we have been able
to feel, to think and to say, was outside our true self; that we were witnesses, not
actors; and that before we can go home, we must take off our masks, standing like
strangers on a strange stage, and wondering how for so long a time we did not perto us in this earthly

ceive even within ourselves the simple distinction between pcrso>/a and pcrso?ia

between the mask and the wearer.
"There is a Sanskrit verse which an Indian friend of mine, a famous Minister
of State, sent me when retiring from the world to spend his last years in contemplation of the highest problems:
'

I

am

not this body, not the senses, nor this perishable, fickle mind, not

even the understanding
entirely dull matter?
friends, land,

;

I

am

I

not indeed this breath

do not

and wealth.

I

am

how should

I

be this

the witness only, the perceiving inner self,

the support of the whole world, and blessed.'

*

And now

;

desire, no, not a wife, far less houses, sons,
"

*

the great philologist himself has passed away; his

Self also has been

merged

in the All-Self, creature in creator.

The

such as have been granted to
few; his mission has been fulfilled to the utmost; and it was with
As Tacitus said of Agricola,
this consciousness that he departed.
"Let us dwell upon and make our own the history and the picture, not of his person, but of his mind.
For all of him that
we follow with wonder and love remains and will remain forever
in the minds of men, through the endless flow of ages, as a portion
fulness

and purport

of his life are

.

of the past."

.

.

